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Abstract
To examine the impact of globalization on managerial compensation, we
consider a matching model where a number of firms compete both in the
product market and in the managerial market. We show that globalization,
i.e. the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools,
leads to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries. Typically,
while the most able managers obtain a wage increase, less able managers
are faced with a reduction in wages. Hence our model can explain the in-
creasing heterogeneity of CEO compensation that has been observed in the
last few decades.
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1 Introduction
The salaries of top managers have recently received considerable public attention. Ac-
cording to Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), the average base salaries and bonuses of
Forbes 800 CEOs increased from 700,000 U.S. dollars in 1970 to more than 2.2 mil-
lion dollars in 2002.1 This effect is even larger when stock options are taken into
account. Similar observations have been reported in Europe (Murphy, 1999). Such
figures cause particular concern when they are related to ordinary wages. The ratio
between CEO cash compensation and average pay for production workers in the U.S.
climbed from 25:1 in 1980 to 90:1 in 2000 (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). It is hardly
surprising that this particular aspect of income redistribution has been highly contro-
versial. Shareholders, labor unions, politicians and mass media have criticized both the
level of managerial incomes and the tenuous connection between pay and performance.
The discussion is by no means confined to the United States, as recent surveys in the
Economist (Economist, 2007) and a reader in the Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung (NZZ, 2006)
with 47 articles on the subject from 2001 to 2006 testify. In the United Kingdom,
the discussions have led to the introduction of transparency rules for managerial pay
(Severin, 2003).
Given the amount of public attention and the substantial academic research in this
area, it is surprising that the causes of the recent salary increases are still imperfectly
understood. In line with popular opinion, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) attribute the
developments to managerial power. Shareholders, so the argument goes, have limited
control over the wage-setting process, and the board often gives in to the interests of
CEOs.
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) take issue with such explanations. Without necessarily
denying the existence of managerial rent-seeking activities, they argue that an ex-
planation for recent salary increases on this basis would also require an increase in
managerial power, which they find unconvincing. Instead, they propose the idea that
the changes reflect an increasing demand for general, rather than firm-specific, man-
agerial skills, “perhaps as a result of the steady progress in economics, management
science, accounting, finance and other disciplines which, if mastered by a CEO, can
1The figures are in 2002 dollars. The Forbes 800 list contains all companies ranked in the top 500
by assets, income, market capitalization or revenues. Typically, there are about 800 companies on the
list.
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substantially improve his ability to manage a company” (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004,
p.193). This results in an increasing tendency for outside hiring and a resulting com-
petition for managers that drives up wages. Gabaix and Laudier (2006) argue that the
increase in managerial pay can be attributed to an (exogenous) increase in firm size.2
In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation of recent trends that relates to
informal arguments that are often advanced in popular accounts of the subject. Some
observers regard increasing managerial wages as a by-product of globalization (Siegen-
thaler, 2003). To our knowledge, however, no attempt has been made to analyze the
relation between globalization and managerial wages in a precise fashion. Our paper
is an attempt to fill this gap.
We investigate how the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial
markets affects managerial wages. We consider a matching model where a number of
firms compete both in the product market and in the managerial market. In the product
market, they interact as oligopolists. In the managerial labor market, they compete
for the services of managers with heterogeneous abilities, where the heterogeneity is
reflected in the different marginal cost levels of the firms they manage. Globalization
thus refers to the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools.
The effects of globalization on managerial remuneration are subtle, because national
markets are replaced by larger product markets with higher demands, more firms and
a larger pool of managers. Nevertheless, we obtain a robust prediction about the
effects of globalization on the distribution of managerial wages: Globalization leads
to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries. Typically, while the most
able managers obtain a wage increase, less able managers are faced with a reduction in
wages. Hence our model can explain the increasing heterogeneity of CEO compensation
that has been observed in the last few decades.
However, our model does not necessarily predict an increase in the average wage levels
of managers. The reduction in wages for less competent managers may well offset the
wage increases of the most competent managers. Nevertheless, our approach is consis-
tent with the idea that globalization lies behind the increasing wages of top executives.
Empirical results on average managerial salaries typically refer to the averages within a
2Baranchuk et al. (2006) also argue that increasing firm sizes play a role in the process, but they
relate these size changes to underlying changes in demand.
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fairly small group of top managers.3 As our model predicts pay rises for the best-paid
managers due to globalization, such averages should also be expected to rise.
It is crucial for our results that the equilibrium wage differences between more and less
competent managers reflect the differences in profits between more and less efficient
firms. Understanding the effects of globalization on managerial wages therefore boils
down to understanding how efficiency differences translate into profit differences. Intu-
itively, the more intense competition induced by globalization increases the payoff for
being more efficient in the sense that the profit ratio between the most efficient firm
and its less efficient competitors necessarily increases.
While we believe we have uncovered the critical link between globalization and man-
agerial wages, we do not claim to have a full theory of managerial compensation. Most
obviously, we abstract from problems of asymmetric information that loom large in
the literature on the subject. In our model, managerial abilities can be observed, and
providing incentives for managers to choose the right action is not an issue. Several
existing papers (e.g. Schmidt, 1997 and Raith, 2003) deal with the effects of increasing
competitive intensity on managerial compensation in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. However, the relation between the concept of increasing competition and our
more explicit notion of globalization as the integration of product and labor markets is
vague. We have chosen to abstract from asymmetric information because this allows to
identify the basic mechanism in the most transparent way - that globalization increases
the payoff for being more efficient than competitors and therefore has a positive effect
on wage spread. There is no reason to suppose that this effect would not survive in a
richer model.
Our paper is related to the literature on superstars initiated by Rosen (1981), who
shows how quality differences between agents lead to more than proportional differ-
ences in wages, turning agents with a fairly small quality advantage into “superstars”
earning substantially more than the others. Our arguments show that globalization
moves the market for managers closer to such a market for superstars.4 In the context
of globalization, such superstar effects have for instance been discussed by Manasse
and Turrini (2001), who also argue that globalization increases wage heterogeneity.
3Compare footnote 1.
4In addition, Baranchuk, MacDonalds and Yang (2006) consider effort choices for managers in this
framework and derive implied ability distributions for the managers which are highly right-skewed.
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Their analysis differs from ours in several important respects. First, they consider
the differences in wages between skilled and unskilled workers rather than necessarily
managers. Second, the channel through which decreasing trade costs operate is to-
tally different: The increasing wage heterogeneity comes from redistribution of income
between exporting and non-exporting firms whose skill-intensity differs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3,
we characterize the equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effects of globalization as a
comparative-statics exercise. Section 5 presents some extensions of the model which
demonstrate the robustness of the argument. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model consists of a wage-setting stage followed by an application stage and a
product-market stage. Firms i = 1, . . . , I compete for managers m = 1, . . . ,M with
M ≥ I. Each firm has marginal costs c0, but can hire a manager to improve its
operations. We model the effect of a manager by the level of marginal costs c(m) that
he can achieve in a firm. We index the managers by quality, that is,
c(1) ≤ c(2) ≤ . . . ≤ c(M).
Manager 1 has the highest quality and can achieve the lowest marginal cost. Manager
M has the lowest quality. As a normalization, we assume that he achieves no efficiency
gains and thus produces with marginal costs c0. MI ≡ {1, . . . , I} denotes the set of
the best I managers.
At the wage-setting stage, all firms simultaneously make wage offers to all managers.
We denote the offer of firm i to manager m as wim.
In the application stage, after having observed the wage bids, managers decide which
offer to accept. Outside options are normalized to zero. In the first round of the
application stage, each manager accepts the highest non-negative offer.5 If several
firms have offered the most attractive wage to a manager m, he will select one of
these firms randomly. If only one manager accepts an offer from firm i, he will be
employed. If two or more managers accept the offer, the firm will select one of them.
5As a tie-breaking rule, we thus assume that all managers choose to be employed as long as wages
are non-negative, that is, at least as high as the outside option.
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As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that a firm chooses the most competent manager
if it is indifferent among several managers.6 In the second round of the application
stage, the procedure is repeated with the rejected managers and the firms who have
not yet filled their vacancy. The application process continues until each manager is
either employed by a firm or rejected by all firms.
In the product-market stage, the I firms engage in oligopolistic competition, with
marginal costs ci given by the outcome of the application stage. Though several of our
results are more general, we often specialize to a case where firms are Cournot com-
petitors producing homogeneous goods facing an inverse demand function p = a− bx,
where x is aggregate output, p is the price, and a, b are two positive numbers. We use
mi to denote the index of the manager hired by firm i, andMI−i for the set of managers
hired by its competitors if the best I managers are hired by the industry. Hence, gross
profits Πi of firm i can be written as Π
(
mi,MI−i
)
. In most oligopoly models, for any
given distribution of managerial abilities in MI−i (and thus implied marginal costs),
profits are independent of the exact matching between competitors and managers in
MI−i. Finally, net profits (or payoffs) of firm i are Π
(
mi,MI−i
)− wi,mi .
3 Equilibria
We now characterize the set of equilibria of the matching model just described, pro-
viding results that are not specific to the linear Cournot model we focus on later.
3.1 Symmetric Equilibria: Necessary Conditions
We first give a necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium where the I most
productive managers are employed.
Proposition 1 A symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which managersMI are em-
ployed requires that for any i and k with 0 < k ≤ I − i
wii − wi+k,i+k = Π(i,MI−i)− Π(i+ k,MI−(i+k))
6This tie-breaking rule can be dispensed with by formulating that matching process as a dynamic
game where firms approach managers in decreasing order of ability. Propositions 1 - 3 can still be
derived in such a model with slightly more notational complexity.
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The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that the wage differentials between managers reflect the addi-
tional gross profit that a firm achieves by replacing a less competent manager with a
more competent manager at the expense of some competitor.
Note that in any equilibrium, we must have wiM = 0 for all i, as manager M has no
effect on costs.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria
Proposition 1 provides necessary conditions for the equilibrium wage differentials. We
now show that an equilibrium with these wage differentials actually exists.
Proposition 2 There exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which the set
MI is employed and each firm offers the wage scheme
w∗im = 0 for m ≥ I
w∗im = Π
(
m,MI−m
)− Π (I,MI−I) for m < I.
Firm i employs manager m ∈ MI with probability 1
I
. All firms have identical net
profits, Π
(
I,MI−I
)
.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in the Appendix.
Intuitively, with the proposed wage w∗im increases in gross profits from hiring better
managers would be exactly offset by corresponding wage increases. Conversely, lower
wages would be offset by losses in gross profits resulting from lower efficiency.7
We now show that no further equilibria exist in pure strategies.
Proposition 3 There does not exist a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with
wiI > 0
7In the context of company worker training and technological spillovers it has been already observed
that equilibrium wages of workers or R&D employees are given by their effects on firms profits (e.g.,
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003)).
7
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
Intuitively, in the proposed equilibrium a firm that deviates by offering the value of
the outside option which is 0 to all managers would still be able to hire manager M
and thus obtain net profits Π(I,MI−I) rather than Π(I,MI−I)− wiI .
4 The Impact of Globalization
We now consider the effects of integrating the product markets and the managerial labor
markets of two identical countries. To this end, we focus on the Cournot specification
of our model. We first derive explicit formulas for profits and wages for this model in
the case of autarky. Then we derive the corresponding expressions for a global economy
for which both the number of firms and the demand are twice as high as in the autarky
case.
4.1 Autarky
Autarky is characterized by a set of I firms, inverse demand p = a − bx (b > 0) and
marginal costs (c1, . . . , cI) . The output of an individual firm i is denoted by xi and
x =
∑
i
xi is the aggregate output. We use the standard result that profits in a Cournot
oligopoly are
Πi =
1
b (I + 1)2
(
a− Ici +
∑
j 6=i
cj
)2
. (1)
The corresponding output levels are
xi =
1
b (I + 1)
(
a− Ici +
∑
j 6=i
cj
)
.
To guarantee that even the least efficient firm produces a nonnegative output, we
assume
a− IcI +
∑
j 6=I
cj ≥ 0. (2)
We simplify notation by associating Π(m,MI−m) with Πm and we label equilibrium
profits and wages in the autarky case by ΠAm and w
A
m, respectively. Π
A
m is given by (1),
and wAm is given in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 In the case of autarky, the equilibrium wage is given by
wAm =
cI − cm
b(I + 1)
(
2
(
a+
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj
)
− (I − 1) (cI + cm)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the appendix.
4.2 Integration
We next consider integration by letting two countries of equal size and with an equal
pool of managers integrate. Hence, we have only one product market with 2I firms,
aggregate demand p = a− b
2
· x and two managers of each quality c(m).8 Equilibrium
profits and wages under integration are denoted by ΠGm and w
G
m, respectively, where m
varies between 1 and I and each m stands for two firms that have the same marginal
costs cm.
Adapting (1) to the integration set-up yields
ΠGm =
2
b (2I + 1)2
(
a− 2Icm +
∑
j 6=m
cj +
I∑
j=1
cj
)2
.
In order to guarantee that the output of the least efficient firm under integration is
nonnegative, we assume
a− 2IcI + 2
∑
j 6=I
cj + cI ≥ 0 (3)
This leads to a characterization of wages after integration.
Lemma 2 In the integrated economy, the equilibrium wage is given by
wGm =
2 (cI − cm)
b(2I + 1)
(
2
(
a+ 2
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj
)
− (2I − 3) (cI + cm)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and thus omitted here.
8The demand function results from horizontal addition of the two identical autarky demand func-
tions.
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4.3 Comparison of Wages before and after Integration
In order to compare wages before and after integration, we have to make sure that
firms operate under autarky and under integration. The following proposition ensures
that Condition 3 is sufficient for profits of all firms to be positive before and after
integration.
Proposition 4 The set of parameters for which output and profits of the least efficient
firm are at least zero under integration is contained in the set of parameters for which
this is true under autarky.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix.
Intuitively, while integration increases competition, it also increases demand. Propo-
sition 4 says that the first effect dominates, so that it is easier for a firm to survive
under autarky than under integration.
For the moment, we shall assume for simplicity that Condition 3 holds, so that all
firms that operate under autarky survive under integration. Clearly, Proposition 4
suggests that firms that are marginal before autarky may well be driven out of the
market after integration. In section 5, we therefore relax Condition 3. It will turn out
that the conclusion we shall derive below will be reinforced if globalization leads to a
consolidation of the market.
To compare the wage profiles under autarky and integration, we focus on the simple
case of constant ability differences:
cm = cI − (I −m)∆, m = 1, . . . , I, ∆ > 0. (4)
The following central result shows that integration increases the sensitivity of manage-
rial wages to ability differences.
Proposition 5 Assume that cm is defined as in (4). Then
wGm > w
A
m if and only if m < m
crit ≡ 2 (a− cI) + 2∆I (I + 2)
(2I + 1)∆ (I + 1)
.
The proof of Proposition 5 can be found in the Appendix.
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Proposition 5 is our main result. It indicates that integration causes the wages of the
most able managers to increase, while lower-quality managers suffer a pay cut. Inte-
gration increases the spread between the compensation of high-quality and low-quality
managers. This increasing spread reflects the increase in the intensity of competition
brought about by globalization. As it pays off more to have better managers, firms com-
pensate efficiency differentials with higher wage differentials. When the heterogeneity
between managers is small, the critical value mcrit is degenerate, so that integration
will benefit all managers. This is captured in the following corollary:
Corollary 1
(i) ∂m
crit
∂∆
< 0
(ii) lim
∆→0
mcrit = ∞
Moreover, we obtain:
Corollary 2
(i) ∂m
crit
∂a
> 0
(ii) ∂m
crit
∂I
< 0 ∀ I ≥ 2
The proof of Corollary 2 is tedious but straightforward and therefore omitted. Thus,
as the demand captured by the parameter a increases under autarky, more managers
will benefit from integration, whereas the converse statement holds for increases in the
number of firms under autarky.
4.4 Numerical Examples
We have analyzed the model for several parameter values (see Table 1). The calcula-
tions suggest a number of insights beyond those already captured by the above results.
First, the ratio between the profit of the most efficient firm and the profit of the second-
best firm is higher under integration (ΠG1 /Π
G
2 ) than under autarky (Π
A
1 /Π
A
2 ). Similar
results also can be shown to hold for the ratio of the leader’s profit and those of all
other firms. Thus, integration increases competition in the sense proposed by Boone
(2000).
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Scenarios Results
I ∆ a b cI
ΠA1
ΠA2
ΠG1
ΠG2
M∑
i=1
ΠGi
M∑
i=1
ΠGi
M∑
i=1
wAi
M∑
i=1
wGi m
crit
1. 5 10 300 1 100 1.47 1.78 7722 6000 6333 6000 1.66
2. 5 10 600 1 100 1.22 1.38 38556 24347 16333 16909 2.58
3. 5 10 1000 1 100 1.13 1.22 118556 71950 29667 31455 3.79
4. 5 10 1500 1 100 1.08 1.15 281056 168645 46333 49636 5.30
Table 1: Numerical results for cm = cI − (I −m)∆
Second, total profits under integration (
∑
ΠGi ) are lower than under autarky (
∑
ΠAi ).
Again, this reflects increasing competition. Third, and most importantly, total man-
agerial wages are not necessarily higher under integration (
∑
wGi ) than under autarky
(
∑
wAi ). The perception that globalization benefits all managers may therefore be mis-
leading. In view of our earlier results, it seems more likely that globalization generates
an increasing spread of managerial wages, with increasing top salaries, but decreasing
salaries for less efficient managers. However, as shown in Corollaries 1 and 2, for sce-
narios with a small number of firms and small cost differences (small heterogeneity),
integration raises the wages of all managers, which is illustrated in the fourth scenario
in Table 1.
We illustrate the impact of integration on the level and distribution of wages of man-
agers for the four scenarios in Table 1 in Figures 1 - 4. These figures plot the equilibrium
wages under autarky and integration, respectively. The figures illustrate how global-
ization increases the wage spread. They also show how an increase in market demand
shifts the critical level in mcrit to the right, eventually leading to a situation where all
managers benefit from globalization.
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5 Robustness
To illustrate our effect in the most transparent way, we resorted to a number of sim-
plifying assumptions. In the following, we will show that these simplifications are not
crucial for the results.
5.1 Entry and Exit
Most obviously, we considered the number of firms as exogenous, not allowing for entry
or exit. As in the monopolistic competition framework of Melitz (2003), globalization
is likely to lead to the exit of inefficient firms in our model. We shall now demonstrate
that our results are reinforced if we allow for this possibility.
To this end, we modify the model by assuming that there is a pool of potential firms that
is so large that, at least the firms with relatively inefficient managers would optimally
set outputs equal to zero. We then add an initial stage where firms decide whether
they want to be in the market. After that, the game proceeds as before. We suppose
that there are small, but positive fixed costs of being in the market.
The equilibrium structure will then be as follows. Under autarky, the number I of
firms is determined so that the marginal firm earns non-negative profits, whereas any
additional firm would earn negative profits if it entered the market. After integration,
by Proposition 4, there cannot be net entry. More specifically, if condition (2) holds,
but condition (3) does not, there will be net exit until the marginal firm has profits
slightly above zero, so that the number of firms in the market will be smaller than 2I.
Compared to the benchmark case without exit, that is, with 2I firms, the remaining
non-marginal firms benefit from the exit of the competitors, so that their profits are
higher than in the benchmark case. As a consequence, the profit differential between the
best firm and the marginal firm increases, which immediately translates into an increase
in the wage differential. Summing up, therefore, the increase in wage heterogeneity
discussed in Section 4 is reinforced.
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5.2 General Managerial Abilities
Another special aspect of our model is that managerial abilities are specific to one
product market. Clearly, however, managerial talents are often more general. We will
therefore show that our results are not affected when firms from different industries
compete on the managerial labor market.
The simplest way to do so is to suppose that there is a finite number of copies of
the product market described in Section 2 in each country, with firms from all indus-
tries competing for the same pool of managers. Thus, we go to the opposite extreme
where managerial talent is fully general rather than specific to a particular industry.
Globalization then corresponds to the simultaneous integration of all product markets
and the managerial labor market. The equilibrium analysis parallels Section 3. In
equilibrium, firms from all industries make wage offers to all managers. Wages are
determined according to Propositions 1-3; with the obvious difference being that MI−i
now corresponds only to the subset of managers employed by the other firms in the
same industry. As a result, the effects of globalization can be calculated in exactly the
same way as in Section 4.
5.3 Alternative Cost Structures
While the general analysis up to and including Proposition 4 holds for arbitrary cost
distributions, the numerical simulations were based on constant ability differences.
Again, this simplification is not essential for our conclusion that globalization leads to
increased wage heterogeneity. For instance, Proposition 5 holds for a flexible functional
form for ability differences given by9:
cm = cI −∆1− γ
I−m
1− γ , γ ∈ (0, 1) (5)
Such a functional form captures decreasing ability differences. For γ approaching 1 we
obtain constant ability differences which we used in our numerical exercise.
9Details are available upon request.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how globalization affects the distribution of managerial
wages. Our key insight is that globalization increases the heterogeneity of managerial
salaries. Numerous issues deserve further scrutiny. For instance, incorporating asym-
metric information and agency costs, or increasing demand for general rather than
firm-specific managerial skills into our model suggests further insights into the struc-
ture of managerial compensation. Our paper may constitute a benchmark model for
such research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We consider the best-response conditions. Firm i+k will not want to poach the higher
quality manager m = i from firm i by offering a higher wage if
Π(i+ k,MI−(i+k))− wi+k,i+k ≥ Π(i,MI−i)− wii
Firm i will not want to offer a higher wage to the lower-quality manager m = i+ k if
Π(i,MI−i)− wii ≥ Π(i+ k,MI−(i+k))− wi+k,i+k
Together, both inequalities imply the result.
Proof of Proposition 2
Given wage offers w∗im, managers are indifferent among all firms and choose each firm
with probability 1
I
. The only reason for a firm to deviate by offering a higher wage to
some manager would be to employ some m < I. However, by construction of w∗im the
required wage increase would exceed the increase in gross profits.
Now consider downward deviations of firm i. If the wage for some subset S of managers
is reduced, none of these managers will accept the offer of firm i in the first round. The
managers in S will randomize between the offers of firm i’s competitors, whereas the
other managers will randomize between the offers of all firms. With positive probability,
one of the managers inMI \S will accept the offer of firm i in the first round, in which
case payoffs remain unchanged. Also with positive probability, however, all those
managers will accept the offer of some other firm. Then, by our tie-breaking rule that
firms facing more than one application will choose the ablest manager, these other
firms will hire all workers except manager I. This manager, however, will not accept
any wage offer below w∗iI because this is his outside option.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that wiI > 0. According to Proposition 1 wage differences satisfy
wi+k,i+k − wii = Π(i+ k,MI−(i+k))− Π(i,MI−i)
Hence, in the candidate equilibrium wages are given by
w∗im = Π(m,MI−m)− Π(I,MI−I) + wiI for m < I
Equilibrium profits are given by
Π(I,MI−I)− wiI
Thus, a firm j could offer the wages wjm = 0 for all m. According to our matching
procedure, firm j would hire manager I and would obtain profits Π(I,MI−I). Hence,
the deviation is profitable and the equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Lemma 1
We calculate
wAm = Π
A
m − ΠAI
=
1
b(I + 1)2
(
a− Icm +
∑
j 6=m
cj
)2
− 1
b(I + 1)2
(
a− IcI +
∑
j 6=I
cj
)2
=
1
b(I + 1)2
(
a2 − 2aIcm + 2a
∑
j 6=m
cj + I
2c2m − 2Icm
∑
j 6=m
cj + (
∑
j 6=m
cj)
2
−a2 + 2aIcI − 2a
∑
j 6=I
cj − I2c2I + 2IcI
∑
j 6=I
cj − (
∑
j 6=I
cj)
2
)
=
1
b(I + 1)2
(
−2aIcm + 2a(cI +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj) + I
2c2m
−2Icm(cI +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj) + (cI +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj)
2 + 2aIcI
−2a(cm +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj)− I2c2I + 2IcI(cm +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj)− (cm +
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj)
2
)
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After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
wAm =
=
1
b(I + 1)2
(
2a(I + 1)(cI − cm) + (I2 − 1)(c2m − c2I) + 2(cI − cm)(I + 1)
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj
)
=
cI − cm
b(I + 1)
(
2(a+
∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj)− (I − 1)(cI + cm)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 4
The output of the least efficient firm under integration is nonnegative only if
a− 2IcI + 2
∑
j 6=I
cj + cI ≥ 0.
However,
a− 2IcI + 2
∑
j 6=I
cj + cI =
(
a− IcI +
∑
j 6=I
cj
)
− (I − 1) cI +
∑
j 6=I
cj
< a− IcI +
∑
j 6=I
cj.
Therefore, the critical condition for a positive output is easier to satisfy under autarky
than under integration.
Proof of Proposition 5
With cm = cI − (I −m)∆, we get
cI − cm = (I −m)∆
cI + cm = 2cI − (I −m)∆∑
j 6=m,j 6=I
cj = (I − 2)cI − ∆
2
(I2 − 3I + 2m)
Hence,
wAm =
∆(I −m)
b(I + 1)
(
2(a− cI) + ∆(2I −m(I + 1))
)
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and
wGm =
2∆(I −m)
b(2I + 1)
(
2(a− cI) + ∆(3I −m(2I + 1))
)
.
To compare wAm and w
G
m, we calculate the difference w
G
m − wAm:
wGm − wAm =
∆(I −m)
b(I + 1)(2I + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
(
2(a− cI) + ∆(2I + 1)(I −mI) + ∆(3I −m(2I + 1))
)
Since (∗) > 0, wGm − wAm > 0 if and only if
2(a− cI) + ∆(2I + 1)(I −mI) + ∆(3I −m(2I + 1)) > 0,
which is equivalent to
m <
2(a− cI) + 2∆I(I + 2)
∆(2I + 1)(I + 1)
=: mcrit.
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